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STORE-CONSCIOUSNESS 
(Alaya-Vijnana) 
A Grand Concept of the Yogacara Buddhists 
N.A. Sastri. 
Mind has three designations: citta, mznas and vijnana, which 
indicate one and the same thing (Y. Pancavastuka, p. 36). Some authors 
distinguish as follows: What is past is manas; what is to come is 
citta and what is present is vijnana. They are further explained. It 
is called citta considering its movement to a distant past; it is manas 
considering its previous movement and it is vijnana considering its 
tendency to rebirth (Y. Ibid). A similar distinction is admitted by 
the Yogacaras: dtta is Alayavijnana; Manas is klistam manas (defiled 
mind) as well as the mind of immediate past moment; vijnana is what 
cognizes the object in the present moment (Yogacarabhumi, p.I1) The 
Sarv(lstivadina too say that the immediate past moment of consciousness 
is manas, Le. mana indriya, and vijnana is what cognizes its each object 
(fcmt;f srferfqlft"fii: • vi jnanam prativijnaptih -Kol'a. I. 16). 
According to the Satadharmavidyamukh.;t dtta is classified into 
eight as follows: five sensuous consciousnesses as related to five senses: 
eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, the sixth: manovijnana, Seventh: 
Klistam manovijana and the eighth: Alayavijnana (Y. Pancavastuka, 
Appendix. 49-50). The first six are admitted also by all early Buddhists. 
The last two are added by the Yogacarins. Takakusu explains the last 
three types thus: Sense-center, individuali7ing thought-center of 
Egotism, and store-center of ideation (Essentials, p. 37). 
Alaya, store-consciousness is the seed.bed of all that exists. 
Every seed lies in the store-consciousness and when it sprouts out into 
object world a reflection returns as a new seed. This new seed lies 
latent in it and gets manifest when the seed becomes matured under 
favourable conditions (Ibid). The Yogacarabhumi comments: Defiled 
mind is always centre of delusion, egotism, arrogence and self-love 
(II'rq'lT arrdlf~fft.lll~, avidya atmadrsti asmimana trsna). 
The store-consciousness serves as seat of seeds, abode of all 
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ideations, and is counted resasultant and a new birth-taking 
factor (~Cifr:;riRIqp)flf+ITQf"l~qT~I~fqq'JCf;Rt:'.ltffif{,) 
Yo. ch. p. II). Sarva-bijagatam asrayabhavanistham upadatrvipzka-
samgrhitam) 
According to the Abhidharmasutra all elements are deposited 
(as seeds) in store-consciousness and the latter again in the 
former: thus they both go on as mutual causes and effects 
(M. Vibh. Tika, 18). 
This means that the mind reaches out into outer world and perceiving 
the objects put new ideas into the mind-store. Again these new idea-
seeds sprout out to reflect still newer seeds. Thus the seeds are accumula-
ted and stored there. The old seeds and new ones are mutually depen-
ding and form ever-rotating cycle (cp. Takakusu, Essential, p. 37). 
This explanation comes into conflict with the establh.hed tenet of the 
school (Siddhanta), according to which store-consciousness is only 
productive cause of all other active censdousnesses (pravrtti-vijnana) 
which are called collectively 'enjoyable' (upabhoaa). All the impure 
elements are stored in it by way of effects and the store-consciousness is 
related to them by way of efficient cause. It is indeterminate (avyakrta) 
as either good or bad, because it is essentially resultant of acts of previous 
life (vipaka). It accumulates all impres5ions of the effects which re~ult 
from the acts of previous life and are flowing spontaneously therefrom 
(vipaka-ni9'andophola) because it serves as the final cause of the good 
and the bad elements (Kusala-akusala-dhatmadhipatyat). Hence it is the 
efficient cause of all active impure elements as well as the final cause 
of all active consciousness-bodies (M. Vibh. Tika. p. 17-18). 
Vasubandhu who pleads that the entire universe of the subjective 
and objective elements is mel"e transfonnation of one consciousness 
(vijnana-parinama) brings it under three heads: I) one Resultant cons-
ciousnes'l, 1) one thinking mind and 3) Six types of consciousness repre-
senting their re"pective objects, visible matter, etc. Commenting on the 
first, Resultant consciousness Vasubandhu says: 
"It is the resultant and seat of all seeds" (fq'Ulti: whf't"l'lfif{ 
Vipakah sarvabijakam). It is abode of all seeds of defiling elements; 
hence it is termed storing centre (alaya). Or all elements are stored 
in it by w<\y of effects (karya-bhava) and again the stOIing centre is stored 
in every element by way of cause (karana-bhava).1 It is a resultant effect 
since it is produced in the form of different sentient beings in different 
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realms of existence as a result of good and bad acts of previous life. 
(see Trimsika, ver. 1). 
Vasubandhu in his Karmasiddhi (Et. lamotte's French Translation 
in Melanges Chinois Et. Buddhique. Vol. IV. further remarks: It is 
called Adana-vijnana as it assumes the body; it is Alaya-vijnana as all 
seeds of dharmas are stored in it; it is Vipaka-vijnana as it is a retribution 
of the acts of previous life (p. 103). 
It is named BhavanBavijnana in the scripture of the Tamrasatiya 
school, Mulavijnana in the scripture of the Mahasanghika school and 
Asamsarika-skandha in the scripture of the Mahisasaka ~ chool. (p. 106). 
Note: Other two skandhas of the Mahisasaka are Ksanika-skandha and 
ekajanmavadhl-skandha- from Masuda. p. 63. (Ibid. p. 106 n. 13). 
Asanga also considers alaya as Bhavanga (v. M. sutra!' XI. 32). 
Alayavijnana's object and aspect or form (alambana-akara) are 
imperceptible. In the cessation trance (nirodha-samapatti) there is 
one consciousness whose object and aspect are diffiuclt to understand; 
likewise are the object a'ld aspect of Alaya too. It comes under Vijnauo. 
padanaskandh. But the sutra speaks of the six consciousness-bodies 
alone and not of the Alayavijnana (separately). Why so? The intention 
of Buddha is explained in the Sandhinirmocana: Believing that they 
(ignorant) would iJnagine that the Alayavijnana is the soul, I have not 
revealed it to the ignorant people (p. 106-7) Sandhinirmocanasutra, 
stanza cited, p. 103. n. 108: 
iIIT({T"fqTif if'!'" ~) ar)~) l1tff "fcrffl ~ihr,:;r) I 
iij~T'l ~ qfq r( Sl'ilfiTf« +rT~cr an~' qf~~~itll: II 
Adanavijnana gabhira suksmo ogho yatha vartati S'lrvabijojbalana eSo 
mayi an prakasi mahaiva at rna parikalpayeyuhjjcp. Trim. 
bhas. p. 34 with slight variation in the second line. 
Why do they think so? Because this consciousness is beginningless 
(anadikalika) and continues to the end of Samsara; because it is very 
subtle in its aspect, it does not chang~. Six consciousness-bodies are 
gross in their support-object, aspect and model (alambana, akara, 
visesa) and easier to recognize; since they are associated with pasdons, 
klesa and pratipaRsamarBa, counteracting path and they are brought under 
sanklesa and vyavadana, "pollution" and "purification" they are in 
the nature of result.consciousness. By this reasoning one will understand 
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that there exists one causal consciousness (hetu-vijnana). The sutra 
does not speak of this consciousness because it is different from the six 
ones. That is the intention of the sutra for not speaking of the Alaya-
consciousness. Thiswise we explain why the 5utras of other schooh 
speak of only six consciousness-bodies as Bhavangavijnana •.•. etc •. 
(p. 108). 
Vasubandhu pleads that there will be no harm in accepting one 
person having two consciousnesses together: (I) cause-consciom.ness 
and (ii) result-consciousness supporting each other. For, the retribu-
tion-consciousnes,s (hetuvijnana) is perfumed by the active consciousness 
(pravrttivl). When they exis t in two persons there is no such mutual 
relationship. Therefore we do not have any difficulty in this proposi-
tion (p. 109). Ref. also Trimsika, ver. 15'. 
We may note here that the position is quite different with the 
Satyasiddhi. According to this school one person can have only one mind 
at a time. The presence of two minds at a time involves two persons. 
This situation has been necessitated for the school on account of its 
refusing to support the Sarvastivadins' tenet of samprayoga, association 
of thoughts (v .chs. 65'-76.) 
We understand further that the problem of store-consciousness has 
also been discussed by Vasubandhu in his comment on the Dasabhumi-
Sutra wherein this consciousness has ultimately been linked up with the 
Matrix of Tathagata as its interior source. The well-known Avatamsaka 
School of Buddhism (which is founded on the Gandavyuha Sutra) has 
sprung up absorbing much of the traditions and interpretations laid down 
in the Dasabhumi-Sutra and the comment thereon by Vasubandhu 
(Essentials, p. IIO-II). 
The Yogacara Idealists propounded the store-consciousness as 
repository of seeds of the active mind and mental states. We should 
remember that this parent consciousness itself a polluted and impermanent, 
and hence it cannot serve our urge for the spiritual goal which may act 
as a guiding principle in our life purpose. Some sort of this rational 
thinking must have led the later Idealists to postulate the theory of 
causation by Dharmadhatu, Foundation of Elements which is a universal 
principle present in every individual; it is also termed T athaoata-aarbha 
(v. Discussion on this topic in my Bud. Idealism). 
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Let us take note of Takukusu' s ob5e] vation on the cau~atjon­
theory of the later Idealists: The theory of causation by DIJQrmaclbatu 
is the climax of all c~usation theories; it is actually the conclusion of 
the theory of causal origination as it is the univenal cr,usation and it 
is already within the theory of universal immanence, pamophhm, cosmo-
theism Or whatever it may be called. (Essentials, p. 113). The 
causation theory was first expressed by action-cause, since the action 
originates in ideation the theory was in the sceond stage expressed by 
the Ideation-store; the latter ag<:,in was in the third stage expressed as 
originated in the Matrix of Tathagata, Tathagatagarbha (cp. Ibid). 
The above process of thinking is truly a clim"x in the develop· 
ment of Buddhist thought. The theory of ~usation by the sole action-
influence was pleaded by the early Buddhists with a view to saving an 
absurd situation arising out of their no-soul doctrine. The Brahmanical 
system pleads for the soul as a spark of divine power implying thereby 
the presence of God in every individual. Since God is dethroned in 
Buddhism the soul is also likewise dropped. Thus the doctrine of 
immanece (antaryami-vada) that has been emphasized in the Brahmanical 
and other religious scriptures was not favoured in the early stage of 
Buddhism. Now we find a revival in Mahayana Buddhism of the doctrinef 
of immance in the form of Dharmadhatu or Tathagata-garbha which is 
a reverse mode of store-consciousness (v. Ratnagotra for detailed 
elucidation of the Garbha-theory). 
The transcendental knowledge which comes in the possession of 
a Yogin at the final stage of his spiritual endeavour ru.s been designated 
by Vasubandhu as Dharmakaya, Anasravadhatu, Asrayaparavrtti. 
Vasubandhu speaks of it as a:rT~llq~l¥fft', Asraya-paravrtti, because 
a metamorphosis of Asraya-store-consciousness is effected into a non-dual 
knowedge (which is the same as Dharmakaya) as a result of dispelling 
the biotic forces of duali~m which are active from immemorial days 
(his Trimsika, vel'. 19-30 with Bhasya of Sthiramati). 
Vajra-Samadhi calls it Amala-jnana, immaculate knowledge. 
Since this knowledge flashes up trasplanting the polluted store-conscious-
ness ithas been considered a nineth pure knowledge in the Vajra-Samadhi 
(v. Lie benthal, Tung pao, XLlV.P.349). The relatioruhip between 
these two knowledges, may either be identity or diversity. The 
identity view is perhaps favoured by Vasubandhu and his school because 
the transcendental knowledge is not counted as the nineth in the early 
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texts of the school whereas the diversity view is endorsed in the V. 
samadhi. There is possibly a third view 2, viz. the view of indescribabi-
lity which may also be the opinion of Vasub:mdhu (v. his Trimsika, 
vr.22.) 
The nomenclature 'store-consciousness', 'Alaya-vijnana' is not 
quite popular with the logical school of Dignaga, though the school 
advocates strongly in favour of the idealistic outlook of the universe. 
Dignaga, for example, after proving the impossibility of external 
objects existing either in an atomic form or aggregate form elucidates 
in fine how to account for our marlifold experiences of things in the 
outside world. He says : It is the object of our knowledge which 
exists internally in the knowledge itself as a knowable aspects and this 
knowable aspect appears to us as though it exists externally (v. Alam. 
pariksa, ver .6). Here in this context Dignaga is not enthusiast to 
speak of the nomenclature of Alaya-vijnana, though his commentator, 
Vinitadeva makes good the lapse' (v. the forthcoming publication of 
th is comment from Tib. ven.ion) . Dignaga' s reluctance might be 
prompted by the adverse comment from the· opposite camp like the 
Madhyamikas and others. A similar situation may also account. for 
the Lankavatara Sutra's cautious approach to the Yogacatas' eight-fold 
division of consciousness. The Suta, though g'ouped under the 
Yogacara classics is leaned towards the Prajnaparamita doctrine as is 
evident from its solemn declaration that the said eight types of conscious-
ness are not at all transformations of one basic mind. They are indis-
tinguishable like the ocean and its waves, hence they are of one and 
the same trait 
a:rf+r~"l&llJfjr~tft " ~IflI'T "Trq "lW'fl{ I 
\3~eTl!if Cf,{'WllTt ll~ <lJ~ f~l{ I 
fq;m;l ~~t . f:q\9': qf,{IlTT'~)" wl;W II 
(cp. Tucci's paper, IHQ. IV. 545, f). 
The great champion of the Madhyamaka school, Candrakirti 
comments: The advocate of the store-consciousness pleads that it 
is the seat of the seeds of all active consciousnesses and it produces the 
appearance of the world. This advocacy resembles the Brahmanical 
system pleading for God as a creator of the universe .. One difference 
between them is that God is viewed permanent and the Alaya imperma-
nent but in other respect they differ not much. (v. my Sanskrit text. 
Madhi. Avatara, Ch.VI, P.42). 
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The same accusation has been levelled by. Acarya Bhavaviveka in 
his Karatala~rtna. : If Dharma-kaya, Norm-body which is characteri-
zed by the Yogacara as Asraya-paravrtti, met,,!molphosis of the store-
consciousness be admitted in an existing self-being, then it is hardly 
distinguishable from the soul, AtlTh'l.n of the Brhmanical system becau~e 
the soul also is described in their scripture as something existent, but 
beyond the reach by word and mind (v. My skt. text, p. 7S-6). 
Going back still earlier we have the Satyasddhi hurling strictures 
on such theories thus : The concepts of Purusa (or Pudgala) and 
alaya are all wrong views. This tense remark reveals that this author is 
inclined to bring them under the categOl:y of a perverted notion (Y. ch. 
IP)· 
It appears that the Alaya-doctrine does not appeal so much to the 
Tibetan mystics as the doctrine of Sunyata does. The Tibctan Yogin 
Milarepa bears witness to this own sUlmise. 
The following statements about him may be notEd here: "He 
was master architect, well-versed in the exposition of thc science of 
the Clear Void Mind, wherein all forms and substances have their 
cause and origin" (Tibet's Great Yogi, Milarfpa, W.Y. EV.1ns-Wentz, 
po 36) 0 "He was a most learned professor in the SciEnce of the Mind". 
(po3S, para.2) 
It is reported that Milart'pa himself uttered the following : As 
the mere name of food doth not satisfy the appetite of the hungry 
person, but he must eat food, S0, also a man who would learn about 
the Voidne,s of Thought, must meditate so us to realize it .. 0 0 In 
short, habituation to the contemplation of voidnes5 of EquiliblUm, 
of the Indescribable, of the Incognizable forms the four differEnt stages 
of the Four Degrees of Initiation graduated steps in the ultimate goal 
of the mystic Vajra-yanao, (PP.I4.2-143). 
To what particular doctrine of Mahaynna Sect he belongs? 
Milarepa replied: It was the highest creed of Mahayana, it was called 
the Path of Total Self-Abnegation, for the pm pose of attaining Bud-
dhahood in one life-time .... (po IS6). I was perfectly convinced 
that the real source of both Samsara and Nirvz,na lay in the Voidrness 
(of the Supra-mundane Mind). (po 209). Noteworthy is the saying 
uttered on the occasion of his fntering into Find Nirvcma 
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That which is of the nature of the uncreated, 
the Dharma-dhatu, the unborn, the Voidness, 
the Sunyata hath no beginning nor doth it evercease to be, 
E'en birth and death are of the nature of the Voidness. Such being 
the Real Truth, avoid doubts and misgiving about it (p. 288). 
Sunyata, Void or Voidness in the above passages conveys the idea 
of an absolute and unqualified voidness which approaches nearer to the 
Madhyamika's conception of the term than to the Yogacara's positive 
one, efr. Notes on pp. 37, n.s, 28s,n.3, 288,n.3, etc. 
Here we may incidentally take note of an interesting piece of 
truth a common creed of the Yogacara Buddhists that is vouchsaved 
by Milarepa in the saying: "I understand that all sentient beings 
possess a ray of the Eternal and that we mmt work for their salvation and 
development" (p. 85). This confession seems to be an echo of the 
Garbha theory of the Yogacaras. 
Et. Lamotte has drawn our attention to the fact that the term 
alaya can be traced to Pali canonical sources in the passages : 
at~lff~T"T ~T q;w.j ~ a:rll'"S'~:r~a-T atT'"fllfiffir, alayarama kho panayam 
paja alayarata alayamdita, "people are delighted in alaya, engrossed 
in alaya and joyous inalaya" (Ref. Digh.II.P.36,3,37,25; Majhima I, 
167, 32, Samyutta I, P.136,1I: Anguttara II, P.131,30; Mahavastu 
III, P.314,3). But its sense is pancakamaguna, five objects of five 
senses according to comment on Digh. later the Vijnanavadins found 
in the passage a justification of their theory of Alayavijnana, psychologi-
cal basis of the school. He further remarks that the Vimalakirti still 
ignores the Vijnanavadin (Et. Lamotte op. cit. p. 246, n.4). Refer 
to Majh.I.190 speaking of the Alaya in parallel with chanda (wish), 
anunaya (pursuit) and so on. The renowned Buddhist poet Asvaghosa 
still ignores the later technical sense of the term in this line : 
Loke, smin alayarame nivrrttau durlabha ratih. 
The taste towards the retreat is very rare in this world which is 
engrossed in enjoing the sensual pleasures, alaya. Sundarananda, XII,22 
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Some Brahmanical Parallels 
The advocate of transformation-theory (parinamayada) on the 
Brahmanical side is the Sankhya philosopher. His eight rudimentary 
elements are comparable with the Vijnanavadin's groups of eight 
consciousnesses. The Sankhya eight rudiments are: Pradhana or 
Avyakrta, ahankara, buddhi and five great elements (y. Bud. carita, 
XII, 18, Caraka, Sarira, ch.1 and Gita, XIII, 5). The classical Sankhya 
replaced the five gl'eat elements by their corresponding five subtle ones 
a parallel development is also noticeable in the Satya-Siddhi (Ch. 36). 
The Bhagavat Gita in an earlier Chap. VII, 4 declares that the Nature, 
Prakrti is distinguished into eight: Five great elements, mind, manas, 
intellect, buddhi and individuation, ahankara. The polluted mind 
of the Vijnanavadin may be compJ.red with ahankara because both are 
sources of the I-notion, the Gita's mind with Alaya-consciousness and 
buddhi with mano-vijnana. Caraka assigsns to Buddhi the function 
of I-notion from which state are produced five great elements. The 
mind, manas as producer of the world has been stated in the Mundaka 
Up. (I. 1,8) according to the interpretation of Sri Sankara (y. his bhasya). 
This is probably only the passage which mentions the mind as the source 
9f other element~, earth, etc. Let it be noted however that the mind, 
in turn, is a, product of the personal Brahman called Prana, breath. 
It has been previously stated that ciua, manas and vijnana signify 
one and the ~ame thing for the Buddhists. The Taittiviya Up. (11.4) 
mentions manas and vijnana as distinct elements (cp. Katha. III, 1,3)g 
Sankara takes vijnana for buddhi (v. his bhasya). The classical defini. 
tion of manas and buddhi is that the former is characterized as designin-
(sanka/pa) and the latter as deciding (ax},yoyasaya), (Y. Sankhya-karika, 
13, 11) and also accepted by Sankara (v. Taitt, bhasya, II, 3,4, and 
Gita II, 41,44). There are certain contexts where Sankara is obliged 
to identify vijnana and manas (Taitt. II, 6 Bha.) and jnana and buddhi 
as one element (T. kath.a, III, 1,13, bha.). 
The Prasnopanisad, while explaining "Sarva" "all" enumerates 
four distinct states: manas, mind, buddhi, intellect, ahankara, individua-
tion and citta, spirit together with their respestive objects : mantavya, 
boddhavya, ahankartavya and cetayilavya. The last element in this 
group of "all" is p'ana indicating thereby that it is the source as well 
as the binding factor of the entire group. Incidentally we may note 
here that this "Sarva" may correspond roughly with the Buddhist 
.. Sarva" which covers the entire universe grouped into twelve bases 
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("yatana). This apart, the Upanisads and the Gita speck plominently 
of the states: mmas and buddhi probably as a result of the Sankhya 
speculation which perhaps senes as the nucleas of the early metaphysi-
cal rackonings in India. The Buddhists nowhere mention buddhi as 
a distinct mental state although other states like dhi, mati meaning 
p,'z,jna are stated (Y. Trimsika, 10, Conception of Bud. p. 84-). 
According to the reformed school of Buddhism, viz. Satyasiddhi 
one mind element alone is substantial and all other mental phenomena 
are only its different moods and nominal but not substantial. This 
school thus brings under one element all other mental states counted 
into sixty by the Sarvastivadins as separate subst:mtial elements. The 
Vijnanavadins do not dispute with the Sarvastivadins and accept their 
entire list (v. Trimsika and Satadharma. in my Pancavastuka, Appendix). 
They both differ each other, however in their ontological 
outlook, i.e. one is Idealist and the other Realist. Sri Sankara once 
is inclined to deny distinction between manas and buddhi (v. Kena Up, 
I, 1,5: ~;:qiRifr ;:r i{;:r~, Yan manasa na manute .... mantls includes 
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also buddhi(; his authority for this opinion is the Chandog-
yopanisad (I, 5,3) which declares: "'T~: Uif.~ fqf:"f~ ~iIT arqrt{fa: 
arvf~ 0'1: l':T')f"{~Clq ~iqif ~q I Kamas sankalpo vicikitsa sraddha 
asraddha dhrtih adhrtih hdh dhirityetat sarvam mana eva (Y. his bhasya). 
Antahkarana. inner organ is a collective term favoured by the 
Vedantins for different mentd faculties: citta, manas, vijnana c.nd buddhi, 
etc. Another collective term generally found in the Upanisads is Sattva 
having the same idea (v. Sveta. Up. III. 11). A favourite expression in 
the Upanisads is Visuddhasattva to convey the idea that the person of 
purified mind or some inner faculty becomes fit to realize his own self, 
atman, Bri',hman (Y. Mundaka III, 1,8,10, and III, 1,6, etc.). Sattv .. is 
a Sankhya terminology for buddhi, intellect according to. Caraka (v. my 
paper on Sankhya, Bharatiya Vidya, 1951, p. 19o.S). 
May we suggest therefore that this old idea of mind o.r intelleet 
is intended in the term "Bodhi-Sattva", (Bodhi-minded) and "Mahasat-
tva" (great-minded) ? 
One more interesting topic I would like to discuss in this co.ntext. 
The early Buddhists conceive that each sensuo.us consciousnefS has its 
own basis, viz. the eye for the visual conscious, the ear for auditory one 
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and· so· on; What is the basis for the mind, a sixth organ? The 
Sarvastivadin assumes that mind's just previous moment serves as the 
basis for the sub~.equent thought moment. But the early Theravadin 
would not agree with this because a basis according to them ought 
to be of the material character. Hence they postulate Hadayavathu, 
the heart-substflnce as the mind's basis. It is further claimed that this 
postulation has been made in accordance with a popular belief. (cp. 
Compendium. p. 279). Now wherefrom does this popular believe 
come? We have an interesting nanative in the Upanisad. 
The Aita'reyopanisad narrates the process of the world~creation 
as follows:- Ther(~ \\'as in the beginning one Atman alone; and no 
other thing there w.s (lctive (misat). He thought: I shaH create 
the world. He accordingly created these worlds: Ambhos, Maricis, 
Mara and Ap. Ambhas world is what is the above the heaven, 
Dyuloka and also a foundation of the latter. Beneath the haven is 
Antariksa, that is the world of Maricis -Rasmis- rflys of the Sun. benecth 
the Maricis is the earth known as Mara: beneath the earth is Ap- water. 
Then the Atman thought: I shaH create the Lokapalas, guardians 
of the world; then he d'rew out the Purusa from the waters and other 
great elements and shaped him (with head and other parts). He 
heated him (by his tapas); of the Purusa so heated the mouth burst 
like an egg; from the mouth (came out) speech and Agni, fire, nose~; 
bursting breaths and the wind came out; the eyeballs bursting 
came out Caksus, eye .and therefrom Aditya (Sun). the ears bursting 
(came out) the ear organ and thet'efore quarters; the skin bursting hairs 
and therefrom plants and trees came out: the heart bursting mana.J, 
mind and therefrom the moon came out; ..... . 
When the created gods requested the Atman to provide with 
their own dwelling places, the Purus~, was finally presented before them. 
They being pleased entered into their places as per His Order: 
Agni becoming speech entered in the mouth, the wind becoming 
breath entered in the noses, Aditya becoming the eye entered in the 
eye-balls. Disas becoming the ear entered in the ear-holes, O~adhi 
and Vanaspati becoming hairs entered in the skin. Can dramas becoming 
manas, mind entered in the heart •. •..... (v. I and II) 
The above narrative makes obvious that each sense-organ has its own 
basis as well as its presiding diety and thus the mind has the heart as its 
basis and the moon as its presiding diety. 
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The same Upanisad declares on another occasion that the heart and 
the mind are identical: fad etat hrdayam tan mana eva. (III, 1,2). 
It is further stated that all the mental states such as Samjnana, vijnana 
and prajnana and others were all one and the same. This point goes 
quite in agreement with the Satyasiddhi's contention of one mind 
becomi.ng into several mental states. 
Note I (p.6). This interpretation is quite compatible with 
a transformation-theorist, Parinama-radin who is generally counted 
as Sat-karya-vadin, an upholder of the imperceptible presence of 
the effect in the cause. Thus when the effect is presen t in 
the cause, vice-verso also may be the case, i.e. the cause may 
be present in the effect. So this interpretation of Alayais very 
convincing. 
Note 2 (p.IO). For the transformation-theorist the relation 
between the cause and the effect may be both: identity and 
indescribability. Vasubandhu accordingly says Paratantra is neither 
different from nor identical with Parinispanna (ver .22 ). The 
Advaita-Vedantin would also countenmce the same view, efr my 
paper on Gaudapada in the Bulletin, Vol VIII, I, P.33 f. 
Note 3 (p.16). This world of men is termed here Mara 
(~H). The Buddhi.sts can it Maro ("T~), i.e. the ~or1d belong. 
ing to the god of death. 
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